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BY PROF. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL
The law and practice of expert evidence
admissibility has been in flux during much of the
past 20 years. In response to concerns that expert
admissibility was too easy and that courts were often
admitting "junk science" testimony, the U.S. Supreme
Court tightened the rules during the 1990s; but its
directives to lower courts have been less than crystal
clear and have met with varying responses in federal
courts and in the states. Until recently, Nevada's
position in this ongoing debate over "relaxed" versus
'rigid" approaches to expert admissibility has been
mixed and even unclear, embracing aspects of the
federal approach but refusing to affirmatively endorse
federal precedent. In Higgs v. State of Nevada, 222
P3d 648 (Nev. Jan. 14, 2010), the court clarified its
position, rejecting a mechanical or rigid checklist
approach to admissibility. Despite the clarification
provided by Higgs (or arguably because of it), expert
witness testimony remains substantially a matter
of judicial discretion, precluding broad and certain
pronouncements as to admissibility.
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History
During much of the 20th Century,
the bulk of federal courts appeared to
follow the Frye test for expert admis-
sibility. See Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding poly-
graph insufficiently reliable to be used
in evidence). Under Frye, scientific or
technical evidence was admissible, if the
technique or method in question was
"generally accepted" within the relevant
scientific community. Passage of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence during the 1970s
called into question the continued vital-
ity of the Frye test in federal courts.
Nevada did not adopt a state version
of the federal rules but, instead, regu-
lated expert evidence by statute (NRS
50.275). However, the relevant Nevada
Statutes largely mirror the Federal
rules, at least as they read, prior to
relatively recent amendments to Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, done to conform
the express text of the federal evidence
rule to 1990s U.S. Supreme Court prec-
edent. However, both before and after
the codification of the federal rules, Ne-
vada declined to expressly follow Frye. See
Yamaha Motor Co. v. Arnoult, 955 P.2d 661
(Nev. 1998); Santillanes v. State, 765 P2d
1147, 1150 (Nev. 1988) ([in the 65 years of
the Frye test,] "we have neither cited nor
adopted" it). See also Dow Chemical Co. v.
Mahlum, 920 E2d 98 (Nev. 1998)., over-
ruled in part on other grounds, GES, Inc. v.
Corbitt, 21 P3d 11, 14-15 (2001).
The Statutory Standard
NRS 50.275 requires that a testifying
expert must be:
* Qualified in an area of scientific,
technical or other specialized knowl-
edge (the qualification requirement),
* With specialized expertise that will
assist the fact-finder in understand-
ing the evidence or determining a
fact at issue (the assistance require-
ment), and
* With testimony limited to matters
within the scope of the expert's
specialized knowledge (the limited
scope requirement).
In determining whether a proffered expert is qualified, the
court may consider credentials of the expert, such as: formal
schooling and academic degrees, whether the expert is
appropriately licensed, the expert's experience and specialized
training and the extent of the expert's knowledge and
prominence in a given field. The court may consider other
appropriate factors as may arise.
The Incomplete Daubert "Revolution"
When the U.S. Supreme Court modified federal expert
evidence law in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993), there was some expectation that Nevada,
and other states, would expressly adopt Daubert's approach. In
Daubert, the U.S. Supreme Court was rather self-consciously
attempting to lay down stricter standards of admissibility,
out of a sense that there had been too much admission of
sketchy scientific studies in complex cases, including product
liability (particularly regarding pharmaceuticals), pollution
and medical malpractice actions. Since Daubert, federal expert
evidence law has become more resistant to receipt of expert
testimony. Where proffered expert evidence is excluded, the
successful evidentiary movant (usually a defendant) has often
been able to prevail on summary judgment because of the
claimant's inability to use expert testimony to establish a
genuine factual dispute as to defectiveness, causation or some
other necessary element of a claim.
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States have been hesitant regarding adoption of Daubert.
Nevada in particular has resisted embracing Daubert, although
the court came reasonably close in its extensive discussion of
expert evidence in Hallmark, which is not inconsistent with
Daubert. See Hallmark v. Eldridge 189 P3d 646, 651 (Nev. 2008)
(reversing and remanding overly speculative testimony of a
biomechanical engineer expert that plaintiff injuries could not
have been caused by collision at issue was erroneously admitted
setting forth considerations for assessing expert testimony that
largely track those set forth in Daubert).
The Higgs Decision
More recently, in Higgs v. Nevada, 222 P.3d 648 (Nev. 2010),
the court specifically disavowed adherence to Daubert. See 222
P.3d at 650 ("we reject the notion that our decision in [Hallmark
adopted the standard set forth in Daubert inferentially"). In
Higgs, the court reviewed the murder conviction of the husband
of former State Auditor Kathy Augustine. Higgs was charged
with poisoning her through injection of succinylcholine, a drug
to which Higgs had access, through his work as a nurse.
During the prosecution, the government proffered expert
testimony concerning the nature of the drug and its impact.
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Defense counsel challenged the testimony
on procedural grounds (e.g., insufficient
time for preparation to meet the testimony)
and on substantive grounds, contending
that the testimony did not meet the
Hallmark standards of admissibility.
The court rejected the defense attacks
in an opinion that was unanimous as
to the general ground rules regarding
admissibility (Justices Cherry and Saitta
dissented out of a view that the trial
should have been continued in order to
allow for additional defense preparation,
but agreed regarding expert admissibility
in general). More importantly, for future
] reference, Higgs clarified the court's
approach to expert evidence.
In Higgs, the court reaffirmed the
general rules of expert admissibility but
took pains to emphasize that scientific
precision was not required to make
expert testimony admissible as long as
the expert was sufficiently qualified and
the testimony was helpful to the fact-
finder and sufficiently reliable. A precise
methodology is not required, however,
nor must a proffer of expert testimony
meet a precise checklist of criteria to
gain admissibility. Part of the court's
rationale in Higgs was concern that
courts, following Daubert, had been overly
rigid in applying the criteria for expert
admissibility. See Bahema v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 2010 Nev. LEXIS 23
at 10 (Nev., June 1, 2010) (In Higgs, "we
have expressly rejected the adoption of
federal authority that employs mechanical
application of factors regarding
qualifications of expert witnesses and that
conflicts with our state law").
The Higgs court reviewed U.S.
Supreme Court evidence precedent
since Daubert and noted its emphasis on
discretion for the trial judge, in effect
joining academic critics who have argued
that many trial courts have been too
aggressive in using a too-rigid version of
Daubert to exclude reasonably reliable and
helpful testimony, rendered by experts
who were more than junk scientists.
See 222 P3d at 655-59 (citing scholarly
articles finding misunderstanding and
misapplication of Daubert factors by
federal trial courts). Although finding
the Daubert approach itself acceptable,
the Higgs court took issue with the
"subsequent rigid application of the
enumerated factors" (222 P.3d at 657).
Similarly, the Higgs court emphasized
that Hallmark was "not intended to
cause confusion and cast doubt on the
[traditional Nevada] standard of expert
witness testimony [but] was meant to
clarify the rule that, in Nevada, NRS
50.275 is the blueprint for expert witness
testimony." See 222 P3d at 658.
The Current Standards
Governing Expert Evidence
Although Higgs clearly rejects a
formulaic approach to expert testimony,
it is still of course required that expert
testimony be helpful to the fact-finder
and that the expert be qualified through
possession of special knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education.
See 222 P3d at 659. The Higgs court
emphasized that the language of NRS
50.275 and the judge's sound discretion
provide the touchstone of admissibility
and that the additional requirements
of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
Daubert imposed additional criteria for
admissibility that need not be used by
Nevada courts. See 222 P3d at 659.
"What Hallmark and similar cases
from sister jurisdictions demonstrate
is that whether dealing with scientific
or nonscientific expert testimony, there
is the inevitable overlap of factors
gatekeepers will consider: mainly
relevancy and reliability. By not adopting
the Daubert standard as a limitation on
judges' considerations, with respect to
the admission of expert testimony, we
give Nevada trial judges wide discretion,
within the parameters of NRS 50.275,
to fulfill their gate-keeping duties.
We determine that the framework
provided by NRS 50.275 sets a degree
of regulation upon admitting expert
witness testimony, without usurping the
trial judge's gate-keeping function."
See 222 P3d at 548-59. See also Higgs,
222 P3d at 658 ("we see nothing about our
decision to adhere to state law, while looking
at federal jurisprudence for guidance - when
needed") (italics in original).
Subsequent to Higgs, the court
rejected a challenge to expert testimony
because of failure to make timely
objection and on implicit harmless error
rounds. However, the court nonetheless
disapproved of purported "recall bias" expert testimony as
unduly speculative as applied to issues of witness credibility.
See Thomas v. Hardwick, P3d _, 2010 Nev. LEXIS 19 at *26-
*27, 126 Nev. Adv.Op. No.16) (Nev. May 27, 2010) ("we have
found no published case approving its admission on individual
witness credibility ... such use of recall bias testimony invades
the province of the jury and seems unhelpful. We thus decline
respondents' invitation to equate recall bias testimony with the
cross-cultural eyewitness identification testimony we permitted
in Echavarria v. State, 108 Nev. 734, 839 P.2d 589 (1992).")
Although Higgs marks a withdrawal from Hallmark, in
favor of traditional Nevada expert evidence law rather than
an implicit embrace of the federal Daubert standard, the Higgs
precedent, as applied in Thomas, demonstrates that the Nevada
Supreme Court and state trial courts retain substantial power
to limit the admissibility of expert evidence seen as suspect
or misleading. E
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